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1. INTRODUCTION 
A blockcipher is said to have a linear factor if, for all plaintexts and keys, there is a fixed 
non-empty set of key bits whose simultaneous complementation leaves the exclusive-or sum of a 
fixed non-empty set of ciphertext bits unchanged. 
Since it appears infeasible to test all possible combinations of key bits and ciphertext bits 
for DES [NBS 77], we tried to find linear structures in the separate rounds of DES and hoped 
that these structures could be combined to yield a linear factor over the whole cipher. This 
naturally led us to the notion of "sequences of linear factors." In general, there might be linear 
factors that cannot be derived from sequences of linear factors, but under our assumptions about 
DES (detailed below) it seems that factors for the whole cipher would consist of sequences of fac-
tors for the individual rounds. Our notion of sequence of linear factors extends that of "per 
round linear factors" introduced by Reeds and Manferdelli [84]. The essential difference is that 
sequences of linear factors allow different rounds to have different linear factors, while per round 
linear factors must remain the same for each round. 
We have given several examples of blockciphers, consisting of consecutive rounds of DES, 
that are vulnerable to a known plaintext attack faster than exhaustive key search. For instance, 
the blockciphers consisting of the first 4, 5 or 6 rounds of DES can be attacked about 219 , 29, 
and 22 faster than by exhaustive key search, respectively. The results presented do not work for 
the blockcipher consisting of rounds 1-7 of DES, but for the blockcipher consisting of rounds 2-8 
we can save a factor 2. 
This research was supported in part by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research 
(~.W.O.). 
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The attacks considered are of the "meet-in-the-middle" type. Such an attack on a blockci-
pher composed of R consecutive rounds of DES can be described as follows: Suppose a crypta-
nalist has a plaintext p and corresponding ciphertext c. For each guessed key k the cryptanalist 
enciphers p with the first S rounds of DES yielding d', and deciphers c with the last R - S rounds 
yielding d". If d'=d", the cryptanalist concludes that k is the true key. Considerably less guesses 
for the key are required compared to exhaustive key search when there are i and j such that both 
the j-th bit of d' and the j-th bit of d" are independent of the i-th key bit. By independence we 
mean that for all,p, c, and k, the j-th bit of d' and the j-th bit of d" are unchanged when the i-th 
bit of k is complemented. 
Meyer [78] argued that blockciphers consisting of R consecutive rounds of DES can have 
ciphertext bits independent of key bits if and only if R ,,,;;;4. In his arguments he used the 
unproved assumption that between two adjacent rounds of DES no dependencies are cancelled. 
This assumption means that if some output bit of the i-th round is functionally dependent on cer-
tain input bits for the i-th round and if some of these input bits are functionally dependent on 
the t-th key bit, then that output bit is also dependent on the t-th key bit. Meyer's assumption 
can be considered as a special case of the assumption that linear factors in DES always result 
from sequences of linear factors in the individual rounds. Under this general assumption, we 
show that blockciphers consisting of eight or more consecutive rounds of DES have no linear fac-
tors, and as a special case, that such ciphers are not subject to the kind of meet-in-the-middle 
attacks described above. 
The next section explains how linear structures can be helpful in cryptanalysis while intro-
ducing some necessary notation. Subsequent sections consider whether DES with a reduced 
number of rounds has such structures. Potential extensions to more rounds of DES are men-
tioned in our concluding remarks. 
2. LINEAR STRUCTURES IN BLOCKCIPHERS 
This section gives an overview of various kinds of linear structures which blockciphers can 
have, together with their possible consequences for cryptanalysis. Some of the ideas in this sec-
tion are included in [Hellman et al 76] and [Reeds and Manferdelli 84]. 
Some elementary notation that will allow us to make precise statements in the remainder of 
the paper is now introduced. Let IF 2 ={O,1} be the finite field of two elements. By IF~ we shall 
denote the vector space of n-tuples over IF2 . Elements of IF~ are denoted by bold characters such 
as x or strings x 1x 2 · · • Xn, with xi E IF 2 , and with the coordinates of x commonly referred to as 
"bits." Elements of the cartesian product IF~' X · · · X IF~' are often denoted by (x1> · · · ,x,), 
where xi EIF~; for i = 1, · · · ,r. When using notions from linear algebra, such as vectors, vector 
spaces, bases, linear mappings, etc. we assume that the underlying field of scalars is IF2. In par-
ticular, the + sign denotes addition of vectors over IF 2, sometimes referred to as exclusive-or. If 
A is a linear mapping, then im(A) and ker(A) will denote its image and null space, respectively. 
r 
If 6)j, is a vector space and if 6l1 1, · • • , 6l1, are subspaces of 611, then }: 6l11 denotes the smallest 
j=I 
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subspace of G/l, containing G/l, i. · · · , G/l,,. The subspace of G/.L generated by the set { x,.: a EA } is 
denoted by [ x,.: a EA ]. 
By a blockcipher, we mean a mapping F:~x:x-~. where ~=IFT,9C=IF2 are the mes-
sage space and key space respectively, such that for each kE'X, the mapping F(.,k):~-~ is 
invertible. We denote decryption by F- 1 :~x:x-~. i.e. if cE~.kE'X then F- 1(c,k) is 
equal top, where p is the element of~ for which F(p,k)=c. Finally, if 
Fi.··· ,FR:~ x:x-~ are blockciphers, then the product F=FRFR-1 · · · F1 of Fi. ···,FR 
is defined as follows: if pE~,kE:JC, and if the sequence p1 ,J>2, · · · is defined by 
then 
F(p,k)=p,, 
Let F:~x:x-~ be a blockcipher, where ~=IFT, :JC=IF2. If c=F(p,k) with 
p=p1 ···Pm• k=k1 · · · kn,c=c1 ···Cm, then 
where theJi:fT+n_f2 are boolean functions. Suppose that there are sets {ii.··· ,is} i;;;; 
{ 1, · · · ,n },U i. · · · ,j,} i;;;; { l, · · · ,m} such that the functions fj, are independent of the key 
bits k; with i different from ii. · · · ,is, that is 
This can be written more conveniently as 
c=F(p,k), 
h - - - m fs IF' w ere k=k;, · · · k;,. c=c1, · · · c1,, F:f 2 X 2- 2· 
(1) 
(2) 
Suppose that a cryptanalist knows a pair of plaintext and corresponding ciphertext (p,c) of 
F and wants to find the key k from the equation 
c=F(p,k). (3) 
The cryptanalist may use the following method: (i) solve k=k;1 • • • k;, from (2) by exhaustively 
- - -
trying all k (a value of k can be tried by extending k to a key k by setting all key bits k; with i 
different from i 1, • • • , is to zero, computing F(p,k) and checking if the correct value of c 
appears) and (ii) solve k from (3) by exhaustively trying all k for which k;,, · · · 7k;, are equal to 
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the values found in (i). Assuming that in step (i) only one solution is found, the cryptanalist has 
to do about 
(4) 
computations of F before finding the key. In general, we may not assume that only one solution 
is found in (i). The number of solutions found in (i) can be reduced if the cryptanalist possesses 
M pairs of corresponding plaintext and ciphertext. Suppose that the cryptanalist has the 
plaintext-ciphertext pairs CP1oci), · · · ,(pM,cM) and wants to solve the key from 
Instead of doing (i),(ii), the following method may be used: 
(i'): try all values fork. If a k is found with F(pi.k)=c1, then check if F(pz,k)=c2, 
F(p3,k)=c3, · · · until some i is found with F(p;,k)*c; or i=M. Accept k as a solution if 
F(p;,k)= c; for i = 1, · · · ,M; 
(5) 
(ii'): try all values fork for which k;, · · · k;, is equal to one of the accepted solutions in (i'). If 
F(pi.k)=c1 then check if F(pz,k)=c2, F(p3,k)=c3, · · · until F(p;,k)*c; for some i or i=M. 
Accept k as a correct key if F(p;,k)=c; for i=l, · · · ,M. 
This algorithm finds all keys k with F(p;,k)=c; for i = 1, · · · ,M. In order to estimate the 
expected number of encipherments needed in steps (i'),(ii') we make the following very heuristic 
assumptions: fork= 1, · · · ,r, i = 1, · · ·,Mand for all wrong values of k=k;, · · · k;, the 
Jjk (p;,k) are mutually independent uniformly distributed random variables on {O, 1}; for all j 
different from Ji, · · · ,j,, for all i in {I, · · · ,M} and all wrong values of k the Jj(p;,k) are also 
mutually independent uniformly distributed random variables on {O, 1 }. With these assumptions, 
the expected number of encipherments in step (i') is 
M+(2s-l)(I-T')X(l+2XT'+3X2-2r+ · · ·) 
(where the term M comes from the correct value of k). The expected number of keys which have 
to be tried in step (ii') is equal to the product of 2n - sand the expected number of accepted 
values for k in step (i'), namely 
Hence the expected number of encipherments in step (ii') is at most 
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M+ [2n-s [1+(25 -1)2-M')-1)(1-2'-m)x 
X (1+2x2r-m+3x22<r-m)+ · · ·] 
2n-s +2n-Mr 
o;;;.M+-----1-2r-m 
Therefore, the expected total number of encipherments is at most 
2s 2n -s +2n -Mr 
2M +--- + -----1-2-r l -2r-m 
If Mr>s this is only slightly larger than 2s+2n-s. 
(6) 
Suppose that G,H:~ X'X _,.~ are two b!ockciphers and that F =HG. Suppose that a 
cryptanalist knows a plaintext-ciphertext pair of F, (p,c) say. Instead of solving the unknown key 
k from (3), a cryptanalist can try to solve k from 
G(p,k)=H- 1(c,k). (7) 
Attacks in which k is solved from eq. (7) instead of (3) are called meet-in-the-middle attacks. Let 
d'=d'1 · · · d' m =G(p,k), d"=d" 1 • • • d"m =H- 1(c,k). Suppose that there are subsets 
{ii.··· ,is} of {1, ... ,n} and UJ. · · · ,j,} of {l, .. .,m} such that d';,, · · · ,d';,, d1111 , · · · ,d"1, 
are functionally independent of the key bits k; with i different from ii. · · · ,i5 • In other words, 
there are boolean functions gr. · · · ,g, , h 1, • · · ,h, such that 
(8) 
Now the unknown key k can be found by first solving k;,, · · · ,k;, from g 1 =hr.··· ,g,=h, and 
then solving the remaining key bits from (3) or (7). If the cryptanalist has M plaintext-ciphertext 
pairs, the number of G,H- 1 computations needed is given by (6). 
We now consider linear structures more general than independencies of ciphertext bits or 
"bits in the middle" from key bits. Suppose that A :IF2_,.IF2,B:IF2...,.IF} are surjective linear map-
pings and that there exists a function F such that 
AF(p,k)=F(p,Bk) for pE~, kE'X. (9) 
Given a known plaintext-ciphertext pair (p,c) it is possible to solve the unknown key k from 
- - -
c=F(p,k) by firstly solving k from Ac=F(p,k) and secondly solving k from c=F(p,k), under the 
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restriction that Ak= k. Using that im(A) has cardinality 2s while the equation Ak=k has 2n -s 
solutions, a cryptanalist having M plaintext-ciphertext pairs can find the key in a number of enci-
pherments which is given by (6). 
The linear structures which can be used in a meet-in-the-middle attack are more general 
than those explained above. Such structures exist if there are bl9c~ciphers G,H with F=HG, 
surjective linear mappings A :Vi'->1Fi,B:IF2->IF~ and functions G,H, such that for 
p,cE9ll,,kE:JC, 
AG(p,k)=G(p,Bk), AH- 1(c,k)=H(c,Bk). (10) 
As mentioned in the introduction, given a blockcipher F, it might be infeasible to find out 
if it has any linear factors. Instead of this, one might try to represent F as a product of crypto-
graphically weak blockciphers and check if these weak blockciphers themselves have such linear 
structures. Suppose that F 1, ···,FR: 9Jl,X:JC->~ are blockciphers and that F=FR · · · F 1• 
Let A; (i =O, · · · ,R) be linear mappings on 9R, and let B be a linear mapping on :JC. We call 
(Ao, · · · ,AR ;B) a sequence of linear factors for F (with respect to F 1, · · · ,FR) if there are func-
tions F; (i=O, · · · ,R): im(A;- 1)Xim(B)->im(A;) such that forpE9ll,,kE:JC, 
A;F;(p,k)=F;(A;-1p,Bk) fori=l, ···,R. (11) 
Then there is a function F:im(Ao)Xim(B)->im(AR) such that 
ARF(p,k) = F(Aop,Bk). (12) 
Note again that there may be linear mappings A 0 ,AR,B satisfying (12) for some F which do not 
belong to sequences of linear factors. 
Let G=FMFM-I · · · F 1, H=FRFR-l · · · FM+I · Then F=HG. In a meet-in-the-middle 
attack we will need sequences of linear factors (Ao, · · · ,AM;B),(A'R,A'R -i. · · · ,A'M;B) for 
G,H- 1 respectively, such that 
Also note that if (A' R, · • · ,A' M ;B) is a sequence of linear factors for H- 1 then 
(A' M, · · • ,A' R ;B) is not necessarily a sequence of linear factors for H. 
We need no longer distinguish between sequences of linear factors (Ao, · · · ,AR;B), 
(A'0 , · · · ,A'R;B') with ker(A;)=ker(A';) (i=O, · · · ,R), ker(B)=ker(B'), since they give us 
exactly the same advantage in finding the key. Thus we are mainly interested in sequences of 
vector spaces ('V0,"V-1, · · · ,'VR;G/lf) where 'V;=ker(A;),61.lf=ker(B) for some sequence of linear 
factors (A 0 , • · · ,AR;B). Such sequences of vector spaces are called sequences of factor spaces for 
F. The following lemma characterizes these sequences of factor spaces. 
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Lemma 1 . Let C!f0 , · • · , C!fR k0R, , 61IJ \::IC be vector spaces. Then the following statements are 
equivalent. 
(i) ('Vo, · · · , C!f R ;61IJ) is a sequences of factor spaces for F. 
(ii) F;(p+x,k+y)+ F;(p,k)E'V; 
foralliE{l, · ·· ,R},pE~,kE%,xE'V;-1,YE61IJ. 
Proof: (i)~(ii). Let (A 0, • • · ,AR ;B) be a sequence of linear factors for F with 
ker(A;)=C!f; (i =O, · · · ,R), ker(B)=61IJ. It is easy to check, that for i=l, · · · ,R,pE01t,kE%, 
xECV';-1 , yE61IJ, 
A;F;(p+x,k+y)=A;F;(p,k). 
This proves (ii). 
(ii)~(i). Choose linear mappings A 0 , · · · AR,B such that ker(A;)= CV'; (i =O, · · · ,R), 
ker(B)=61IJ. Define functions F;: im(A;-i)Xim(B)-+ im(A;) (i= I, · · · ,R) as follows: if 
pEim(A; __ 1 ),kEim(B) then choose p,k such that A;_ 1p=p,Bk=k and put F;(p,k)= A;F;(p,k). 
From statement (ii) it follows that the F; are well-defined (i.e. independent of the choice of p,k) 
and that for pE01t,kE:X, 
-
A;F;(p, k) = F;(A; -1 p,Bk). 
This proves (i). 0 
2.1. SOME GENERALIZATIONS 
Here we briefly mention some ways in which sequences of linear factors can be generalized. 
We have not looked for such general structures in DES. As before, F 1, ···,FR are blockciphers 
and F=FRFR -I · · · F 1• One possibility is to consider sequences of factors (Ao, · · · ,AR;B) 
whereA 0 , · · · ,AR;B are not necessarily linear mappings satisfying (II) for certain functions F;. 
Such sequences can be helpful in cryptanalysis if B is a simple mapping, such as a linear map-
ping, a mapping composed of low degree polynomials over IF2, etc. 
A second generalization considers sequences of near linear factors. This notion is an exten-
sion of an idea presented in [Hellman et al 76]. A sequence of linear mappings (A 0 , · • • ,AR;B) 
is called a sequence of near linear factors for F valid for a set ~ of pairs of plaintexts and keys if 
there are functions F; such that for each pair (p,k) in ~ and each i with J :s;;;i :s;;;R, 
-A;p;=F;(A;-1P;-1,Bk), 
where Po =p, p; =F;(p; -1,k). Suppose that F has a sequence of near linear factors 
(Ao, · · · ,AR;B) valid for a set~ containing pairs (p,k) for each key k or more generally, that F 
has sequences of linear factors (A 0 , · · · ,AR ;B), all having the same A 0 ,AR,B and valid for sets 
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§ 1, · • · ,§, respectively, such that § 1 U · · · U §, contains pairs (p,k) for each k. Then there 
exist a positive number C and a function F such that for each key k, the relations 
(13) 
are valid for a fraction ~ of the plaintexts p. If a cryptanalist has C pairs of corresponding 
plaintext and ciphertext, then for each pair (p,c) the key can be solved, under the hypothesis that 
(13) holds for the plaintext p. Thus C keys are found, one of which is expected to be the correct 
key. 
A blockcipher F is said to have key clustering if there exist a mapping F and a non-
injective linear mapping B such that for each key k, the relation 
F(p,k)=F(p,Bk) 
holds for a positive fraction of the plaintexts p. Desmedt, Quisquater and Davio [84] gave a few 
examples of key clustering in blockciphers consisting of at most three rounds of DES. The 
method by which these examples have been constructed can be described in terms of sequences of 
near linear factors as mentioned above. 
3. MEET-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATIACKS ON DES 
Independencies of "bits in the middle" from key bits in DES, which can be helpful in a 
meet-in-the-middle attack, are the subject of this section. First we give an overview of the map-
pings used in DES, assuming that the reader is familiar with the NBS description of the Data 
Encryption Standard. (For the complete description, we refer to [NBS 77]). In this paper, we 
use a slightly modified version of DES in which IP,IP- 1 ,PCJ are not used and E,P are com-
bined to one table EP (cf. Davio et al [83], pp. 184-185). Thus the following mappings are used 
in our version of DES: 
EP:IFF-)IF~8 : EPx is formed from x as follows: first y=Px is formed by permuting the 32 bits 
of x; then EPx=Ey is formed by taking 16 of the 32 bits of y once and the other 16 twice; 
S/IF~ -)IF~ (j = 1, · · · , 8): the mappings defined by the S-boxes; 
S:1F~8 -)1Fi2 :S(x)=(S 1 x1, · · · ,Sgxs) for x=(xi, · · · ,xs) with x1 EIF~; 
L;:1Fi6 -)1F~8 (i=1, · · ·, 16): L;k=PC2(Cr(ilki,C'(i)k2) for k=(ki,k2) with k1,k2 EIF~8 • Here 
Cx is formed from x by applying a cyclic left shift to the bits of x, r(i) is an integer determined 
by the shift pattern in the NBS-description of the key-scheduling and PC2(x,y) is formed from 
x,y by selecting 24 bits from x, selecting 24 bits from y and permuting the selected 48 bits in 
some order. 
The mappings EP,L; are linear. If A is a linear mapping, then we say that A sends p to q if A 
maps the vector of which only the p-th bit is equal to l onto a vector of which at least the q-th 
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bit equals L If A maps the vector with only a 1 in its p-th bit onto 0, we say that A does not 
choosep. Thus EP sends eachp in {1, · · · ,32} to either one or two elements of {l, · · · ,48}, 
while eachp in {1, · · · ,56} is either not chosen by L; or sent to exactly one element of 
{1, ... ,48}. 
We shall now algebraically describe our version of DES. The message space is 0:~4 . Ele-
ments of IF~4 will be written in the form (x,y), where x,y Efi2. The key space is f~6 . 
The mappings F; :o=~4 x IF~6 ~u=~4 (i = 1, · · · , 16) ( the "rounds") are defined by 
and DES :IFr x o=~6 ~IF~4 is defined by 
Thus if qz,<13, · · · are defined by the recurrence sequence 
Q;+1 =q;-1 +S(EP1Ji+L;k) (i=I, · · · ,16) 
Let R,Tbe integers with I.;;;R.;;;T.;;;16. We define 
DESR,T=FTFT-1 ... FR. 
-1 -Jp-1 p-1 DESR,T=FR R +1 . . . T . 
Let R,M,Tbe integers with I.;;;R.;;;M.;;;T.;;;I6. For p,cEIF~4,kEf~6 , we put 
d'=d'1 · · · d'64=DESR,M(p,k), ) 
d"=d"1 · · · d"64=DES,111+. 1.r(c,k), 
k=k1 · · · ks6. 
Our aim is to find out if there are subsets {i 1, · · · , i 64 }, U 1, · · · ,j,} of 
{ 1, · · · ,56},{ 1, · · · ,64} respectively, such that d'J,, · · · ,d'j,, d"J,, · · · ,d"1, are functionally 
independent of the key bits k; with i different from ii. · · · ,is. 
(14) 
Let p,c have the same meaning as above and put p= (CIR -i .<1R),c=(q' T,q' T + i). Define the 
sequences QR -I><IR ,QR+ 1' · · · , q'T + 1,q' 7 ,q' r- 1, · • · by 
'Ii+! =Cii-1 +S(EPCL+L;k) (i=R,R +I,···), 
Q.';-1 =q';+1 +S(EPq';+L;k) (i =T,T-I, · · · )" 
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Lett E{l, · · · ,56}. We define the sets X;(t) (i =R -l,R,R + 1, · · · ), X';(t) 
(i = T + l, T, T- l, · · · ) recursively as follows: 
XR-1(t)=XR(t)= 0 ; X'r+1(t)=X'r(t)= 0 ; 
X; + 1 (t) is the set of indices of the bits of CJ;+ 1 which functionally depend on 
some of the bits of CJ; with indices in X;(t), some of the bits of q; - I with 
indices in X; _ 1 ( t) and eventually k1; 
X'; -I is defined similarly in terms of X';,X'; - 1,k1• 
(15) 
Obviously, the sets of bits of CL. q'; respectively, which are functionally dependent on k1 are 
included in X;(t),X';(t), respectively. An equivalent formulation of Meyer's assumption men-
tioned in §1 is that all indices in X;(t),X';(t) are of bits of q;,q'; which are functionally dependent 
on k 1• For each t, we shall recursively compute the sets X;(t),X';(t). To this end, we introduce 
the following sets: 
U1 ={1,2, · · · ,6}, U2={7, · · · ,12}, ... , Us={43, · · · ,48}, 
V1 ={1,2,3,4}, V2={5, · · · ,8}, · · ·, Vs={29, · · · ,32}. 
Put W;(t)= 0 if L; does not choose t and W;(t)=U} if L; sends t to an element of u1. Finally, 
let 'if be a function, mapping subsets of {1, · · · ,8} onto subsets of {1, · · · ,8} which is defined 
as follows: 'if (A) is the set of integers j with the property that there is an i EA such that EP 
sends an element of V; to an element of u1. In particular, '1¥(0)= 0. 
'1! ({1 })= {2,3,4,5,6,8} '1! ({5}) = { 1,2,3,4,6, 7} 
'if ({2})= { 1,3,4,5, 7,8} '1! ({6})= {1,2,3,5, 7,8} '1¥(0)= 0 
'if ({3})= {2,4,5,6, 7,8} '1! ({7})= { 1,2,3,4,6,8} '1! (A U B)='if (A) LJ 'if (B) 
'1! ( { 4})= { 1,3,5,6, 7,8} '1! ({8})= { 1,2,4,5,6, 7} 
table 1: the function 'if 
We define the sets VR-1(t), VR(t), VR+1(t), · · ·, V'r+1(t), V'r(t).V'r-1(t), · · · recur-
sively as follows: 
VR-1(t)= VR(t)= 0, V'r+1U)= V'r(t)= 0, } 
Vi+1(t)= Vi-1(t) U'if (V;(t)) u W;(t) (i =R,R + 1, ... ), 
V'; -1 (t)= V'; + 1 (t) U '1! (V';(t)) U W;(t) (i = T, T-1, · · · ). 
(16) 
Using that for each S-box in DES, all four output bits functionally depend on all six input bits, 
we obtain 
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X;(t)= LJ VJ , X';(t)= LJ VJ . 
JEV,(t) JEV',(t) (17) 
Hence the integers} in {I,··· ,64} such that at least one of the bits d'J,d"J (cf. (14)) depends 
on k 1 belong to the set 
(18) 
It is very easy to compute the sets Q (t), using the recurrence relations (16).For each subset I of 
{ 1, · · · ,56}, the set J of integers in { 1, · · · ,64} not belonging to any of the sets Q (t) with t EI 
has the property that for j EJ, both d'J,d"J, are functionally independent of the k; with i EI . 
The examples for the sets I,J in the table below have been obtained by computing for each j the 
set of t such that j El Q (t). N = T - R + 1 denotes the number of consecutive rounds. 
R M T N J I #I 
l 2 4 4 9,10,11,12 1,3,4, 10, 14, 15, 18,25,28,32, 19 
35,38,41,42,44,48,49,52,56 
I 2 4 4 41,42,43,44 5,9, 13, 19,20,23,24,26,27,30, 19 
33,36,37 ,39,43,44,47,51,55 
l 2 5 5 41,42,43,44 5,20,26,27,30,37,43,44,51 9 
1 3 6 6 5,6,7,8 7,28 2 
1 3 6 6 17'18, 19 ,20 36,45 2 
I 4 7 7 - - -
2 5 8 7 5,6,7,8, 13, 14, 15, 16 21 l 
table 2 
In the theorem below we state that non-empty sets I.,! of the same type as in table 2 can 
not be found for blockciphers consisting of 8 or more consecutive rounds of DES. 
Theorem 1 . Suppose that R, T are integers with R;;;;,, I, T.;;:.; 16, T~ R + 7. Then for every integer M 
withR~M~Tandforeachtin {1, ·· · ,56}, Q(t)={l, · · · ,64}. 
Proof: Let t,M be integers with 1.;;;1.;;;56,R~M~T. The key scheduling of DES has the pro-
perty that each integer in { 1, · · · , 56} is chosen by at least one of the mappings L;, L; + 1 for 
i = { 1, · · · , 15 }. This can be verified by using the fact that the only integers in { 1, · · · ,56} not 
chosen by PC2 are 9,18,22,25,35,38,43,54. Hence if there is an integer not chosen by L; and LJ 
then r(i)-r(j) must be equal to the difference (mod 28) of two of the integers 9,18,22,25 or of 
two of the integers 35,38,43,54. But r(i + 1)-r(i) is either equal to 1or2fori=1, · · ·, 16. 
From the recurrence relations (16) we infer that the sets VR +2(t), V'r-z(t) are non-empty. It is 
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easy to check from table 1, that ifI' 2 (ifI' iterated twice) maps each non-empty subset of 
{ 1, · · · ,8} onto { 1, · · · ,8}. Again by (16), we infer that VR +4(t) = VR +5(t) 
= · · · ={l, · · · ,8}, V'r- 4 = V'r- 5 = ... ={!, · · · ,8}. We have either M~R +4, or 
M + l~T-4, or M + 1 =R +4 and M = T-4. In these three cases, we have XM(t) U X'M(t)= 
XM+1(t)LJX'M+i(t)={l, · · · ,32}. This proves Theorem 1. D 
Remark. By a similar method as in the proof of Theorem I, one can show that in case T = R + 6, 
Q(t) can only be a proper subset of {1, · · · ,64} if t is not chosen by both LR and Ly. From the 
shift-pattern one recovers that r(R +6)-r(R) is equal to either 11or12 for R =1,2, · · ·, 10. If 
PC2 is made in such a way that no difference of the integers not chosen by PC2 is congruent to 
1,2,11 or 12 (mod 28) then in Theorem 1 we can replace R +7 by R +6. We do not know if, by 
a proper choice of PC2, R + 7 can be replaced by R + 5. 
4. SEQUENCES OF FACTOR SPACES IN DES 
In this section we shall investigate the sequences of factor spaces in blockciphers consisting 
of a reduced number of rounds of DES . We shall use the same notation as in the previous sec-
tions. In particular, the blockciphers F;:IF~4 XIF~6 -7 IF~4 are defined by F;(<Io,Q1,k)= 
(Q1>Qo+S(EPq1 +L;k)) for (Qo,Q1)EIFr and kEIFi6 , and DESR,r=FrFr-1 ... FR. We shall 
implicitly assume that the sequences of factor spaces we will consider are all with respect to 
FR, · · · ,Fy. Our aim is to investigate if DESR,T has sequences of useful factor spaces. (A 
sequence of factor spaces ('YR_ i, 'VR, · · · , 'V y;61il) is called useful if 61Jl :¥=[0] and 'V r=¥=1F~4 ). 
Example 1. Lett E {l, · · · ,56} and let XR _ 1 (t),XR(t), · · · be the sets recursively defined 
by (15). Let 'Y; be the spaces of vectors of which the bits with indices outside 
Y;(t)=X;(t) LJ v>32:j-32EX;+1(t)} 
are 0 and let 61!) be the space generated by the vector in 1Fi6 of which only the t-th bit is equal to 
1. Then ('YR-l>'VR, · · · ,'Vy;61il) is a sequence of factor spaces for DESR,T and this sequence is 
useful if and only if Yr(t) is properly contained in {l, · · · ,64}. 
Example 2. Reeds and Manferdelli [84] introduced the notion of a "per round linear fac-
tor" for DES. A per round linear factor is a linear mapping A on IF~8 for which there exist a 
- -
mapping S with AEPS =SA. If there exists a per round linear factor A which is neither inverti-
ble nor has the property that AE maps each vector to 0 then one can prove that ('Y, · · · , 'Y;61il) is 
a useful sequence of factor spaces for DESR,r, where 
'Y=[(vo,v1)EIFr:AEvo=AEv1 =OJ, 
61Jl=[kEIF~6 :LRk=LR+1k= · · · =Lrk=O]. 
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If 'V,611 are subspaces of n:~4 ,Fi8 respectively, then the spaces SP('V),SK(G/1) are defined by 
SP('V)=[(vi,vo +S(EPv1 +c)+S(c)):(vo,v1 )E'V,cEFi8J, 
SK(G/L) =[(0,S (u+c)+ S (c)):u EG/1,c EFi8J . 
umma 2 . Let 'V R _ 1, 'V R, · · · , 'VT CF ~4 , G[[\ CF ~6 be vector spaces. Then the following state-
ments are equivalent: 
(i) ('V R - i. 'V R, · · · , 'V r;"h\') is a sequence of linear factors for DESR, T ; 
(ii) SP('V;-1)+SK(L;("ll\))c;;;,'V;for i=R,R + 1, · · · ,T. 
Proof: In view of Lemma 1, it suffices to show that for i =R,R + 1, · · · ,T, 
sP('V; -1 )+ sK(L;("lll)) = 
[F;(Qo +v0,q1 +v1,k+w)+ F;(q0 ,q1 ,k): (q0 ,qi)EFr,kEF~6 ,(vo, v1)E'V,wE"ll\]. 
Denote the right-hand side of (19) by "ll\;. Let i E { R, · · · , T}. It is easy to check that for 
(Vo, V1) E'V,cEFi8, 
where k E F ~6 is chosen such that L; k =c. This shows that 
It is also easy to verify that for w E"lll,c EFi8 , 
(O,S(L;w+c)+ S (c))=F;(O,O,k+w)+ F;(O,O,k), 
where again kEF~6 is chosen such that L;k=c. Hence 
=(vi,vo+S(EPv1 +L;w+EPq1 +L;k)+S(EPq1 +L;k)) 
=(v1, vo +S(EPv1 +c1)+S(c1) )+(O,S (L;w+c2)+S(c2) ), 
where 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
I 
f 
r 
... , 
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Hence 
(22) 
A combination of (20),(21),(22) yields (19). D 
In the statement of the next lemma, we use the following notation. Define the linear map-
48 6 * 4 32 •• IF4 IF64 U·IF64 IF48 f 11 • pings Pi:IF 2 ~IF2, Pi :IF2~1F2 , Pi : 2~ 2 • · 2 ~ 2 as o ows. 
Pi(x)=xi for x=(xi. · · · ,x8) with xi. · · · ,x8 EIF~ ; 
P7 (y)=(O, · · · ,0,y,0, · · · ,0) (with y on the i-th place) ; 
P7°(y)={O,p7(y)); 
U(x,y)=EPy. 
Finally, for any subspace GIL of o=~. we define the spaces 1j(G11),T'j(G/.1) (j = 1, · · · ,8) by 
Tj(GIL)=[Sj(u+c)+Sj(c):uEG/1,cEO:~], 
T'j(GIL)=[Sj(u+c)+ Sj(c)+ S/u) +S/O):uEG/1,cEIF~] . 
Lemma 3. 1.et'Y=[(v0j,v!j):j=l, · · · ,p]\:0:~4, "llf=[w/j=l, · · · ,q]C0:~8 be vector spaces. 
Then 
8 
sP('Y)=[(v1j,VOj+S(EPv1j)+S(O)):j=l, ... ,p] + ~ PZ*T'k{pkU({)} (23) 
and 
k=I 
8 
sK("l!f)=[{O,S(wj)+S(O)):j=l, ... ,q] + ~ PZ*T'k{Pk("llf)}. 
k=I 
(24) 
Proof: We shall only prove (23); (24) can be proved in a similar way. For convenience, we intro-
duce the following notation: 
s(v0 , vi.c)=(vi. v0 + S (EPv1 +c)+S (c)) for (v0 ,v1) EO:~,c en=r; 
t'/u,c)=Sj(u+c)+Sj(c)+Sj(u)+Sj(O) for u,cEIF~. 
First of all we remark, that for subspaces 'V1, 'Y2 of u=r, 
(25) 
I 
I 
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and that for subspaces G/Li,G/L 2 of IF~, 
(25) follows easily from the identity 
s(v'0 +v"0 , v'1 + v"1,c)=s(v'o, v' 1,c + EPv" 1) + s(v"o, v111,c) 
f ( I II) (II II )=IF64 =IF48 or v 0 , v 1 , v o. v 1 c:: 2 ,cc:: 2 , 
while (26) is an easy consequence of the identity 
t'j(u' +u",c)=t';(u',u" +c)+ t';(u",c) +t';(u',u") 
for u',u",cEIF~ , j = 1, · · · ,8. 
In view of (25),(26), it suffices to prove (23) for p = 1. Let 'V = [(v0, v1 )] and put 
'V=[(v1 ,vo +S(EPv1)+S(O)]=[s(vo,v1,0)] , 
~J,J =pj* T';{PJ U( [vi]) } =[p j* t';(P;EPvi,c):c EIF~] for j = 1, · · · ,8. 
From the identity 
8 
s(vo,v1>c) =s(vo,v1,0)+ 2.: p;•t:k(PkEPv1,PkC) for cEIF~8 , 
it follows easily that 
- 8 -
Sp('V)r;;,'V + }.; Gllk. 
k=I 
On the other hand we have 
k=I 
Let dEIF~ and choose cEIF~8 such that p1(c)=d,pk(c)=O for k=/=j. Then (27) implies that 
Hence 
ii r;;,SP('V) for j =I, · · · ,8. 
Now (23) follows at once from (28),(29),(30). D 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
207 
Lemma 3 shows that for each subspace 'V of IF~4 ( 6lJf of IF~6 ) the space SP('V),(SK(6lll )) 
can be expressed as the sum of a space generated by a set of vectors of which the cardinality is 
not larger than the dimension of 'V ("llf ) and spaces which can be described completely in terms 
of the S-boxes. Thus Lemma 3 provides us a rather efficient method which checks if a given 
sequence of spaces ('V R 1, 'V R, · • • , 'V r, "llf) is a sequence of factor spaces for DES R. T· From the 
arguments used in the proof of Lemma 3 it is clear, that this method can be applied also to a 
general class of block ciphers which can be described in the same way as DES, with arbitrary S-
boxes (which can be different in each round), an arbitrary linear mapping instead of EP (where it 
is allowed that in different rounds different linear mappings are chosen) and arbitrary surjective 
linear mappings instead of the L;. 
We shall now give explicit expressions for the spaces sP('V), sK(6lJf). For this purpose we 
have only to compute the spaces T1(611) with 611 c;IF~. 
Lemma 4 . For all g in {I, · · · , 8} and all subspaces G/l, of IF~ with G/J,*[01 we have 
Tg(G/t)= T'g(611) = IFt with the following exceptions: 
T 4([000001]) =[l 100,0011, 1010] , T' 4([000001])= [l 100,0011] ; 
T 4([101110]) = T' 4([101110])=[1010,0101] ; 
T4([10l Ill])= T'4([101111])=[1001,0l 10]; 
T 4([000001, 101110]) = T'4([000001, 101110])=(1100,0011, 1010] . 
Proof: This can be verified by straightforward computation. D 
In the theorem below, the sets ~ P ('V),~K(6lll ), with 'V,6lll being subspaces of IF~4 ,IF~8 
respectively, are defined by 
~P('V)={g:l~g~S, PgU('V)*[O] }, 
~K(6lll)={g:l~g~8, Pg("llf)*(O] }. 
Theorem 2 . Let 'V, 6lJf be subspaces of IF ~4 , IF ~8 respectively. Then 
(i) Sp('V)=Ci.r+ 2: "lfg, 
gE:;,'('V) 
where 
_ [ • {a=Oifp4EPv1=000000] 
'V= (v1,vo +ap4(1010)): (va,vi)E'V, a=l if p4EPv1 =000001 
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if p4U('V)=[OOOOOl) ; 
and where 
with the following exceptions if 4 E :ii P ('V): 
'V4=p:*([llOO,OOll)) if p4U('V)=[OOOOOI]; 
'V4=p:*([IOIO,Ol0l]) if p4U('V)=[l01ll0]; 
'V4=p:·([lOOl,OllO]) if p4U('V)=[l0llll]; 
'V4 =p:*((ll00,0011,1010]) if p4U('i/)=(000001,101110) . 
(ii) SK("l!l)= ~ "lllg , 
gE~"(01Jf) 
where "llf g=p;·f~ for g E:iiK("llf) with the following exceptions if 4E:iiK(6l!f): 
"11l4 =p:·([IOl0,0101)) if p4("11l)=[l0l l IO] ; 
"11l4 =p:· ((1001,0110)) if p4(6l!f)=[lOll l l] ; 
G)Jf4 =p:*([ll00,0011,1010]) if p4(G)Jf)=[000001] or (000001, 101110). 
Proof: The proofs of (i),(ii) can be derived easily from Lemmas 3,4. We shall only give a rough 
sketch of the proof of (i). By Lemma 4, 
except when g =4, p4EPv1 =000001. This proves that for (vo,v1)E'V, there is a vector 
u E ~ 'Vg, with 
geS/('V) 
(vi.vo+S(EPv1)+S(O)) = 
= [vi.vo+P;• {S4(p4EPv1)+S4(0)}} +u 
= [vi.v0 +p:·c1010)) +u 
if p4EPv1 =000001. 
These facts immediately prove (i). D 
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We shall now prove that blockciphers consisting of eight or more consecutive rounds of 
DES are resistant against a meet-in-the-middle attack using sequences of factor spaces. To this 
end we shall need the following lemma. 
Lemma 5. Let T;;;.R + 3. If (CVR -i ,CVR, · · · , CV y;G/JJ) is a sequence of factor spaces for DESR,T 
with G/JJ ¥:[01 then 
(i) CVR+3;;;J[(O,y):yEf~2 ], 
(ii) 'YR+;=frfori;;;.4. 
Proof: (ii) is an immediate consequence of (i) and Lemmas 2,4. We shall now prove (i). Since 
all elements of {l, · · · ,56} are chosen by at least one of the mappings LR,LR +1> at least one of 
the spaces SK(LR(G/JJ)),SK(LR + 1 (G/JJ)) is oi=[O]. By Lemma 2 and Theorem 2, 
for some non-empty subset S of {I,··· ,8}, where 'Yi =p;·cfi) if g'i:4 and cvl =p~·(G11,1) with 
G/.i, 1 being a subspace of fi with G/17'=[0] in case that 4 E~. The space G(J, 1 has the property that 
for each} in {1, · · · ,4) there is a vector x 1x 2x3x 4 in G/1 1 with x1¥=0. EP sends the indices of 
the output bits of S-box Sj (i.e the elements of { 4j - 3, · · · ,4j}) to the indices of the input bits 
of 6 different S-boxes, namely the S-boxes Sk with k E '!f ( U} ), where '!f is the function defined in 
table 1. Together with Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 these facts imply that 
'YR +2 ;;;J 2-; cv;, 
gE'!f(S) 
where cv; =p;·cfi) for g¥:4 and when 4E'!f(5i), 'Y~ =p;*('3112 ) for some subspace G/1 2 of fi with 
G/1 2¥:[0]. We remark that 
(31) 
hence G/1 2 = fi if one of the numbers 2,3,5, 7,8 belongs to S. Since §' (5i) has cardinality at least 
6, at least one of the numbers 2,3,5,7,8 belongs to '!f (S ). By repeating the argument from above, 
and using that '!f 2 maps each non-empty subset of { 1, · · · , 8} onto { 1, · · · , 8} , we obtain 
'YR +3 ;;;J 2-; p;*(fi)=[(O,y):y Ef~2 ]. 
g E'!f 2(S) 
This completes the proof of Lemma 5. 0 
Lemma 5 includes the result of Meyer mentioned in §I. Another consequence of Lemma 5 
is that the only per round linear factors of DES are the linear mappings A :fi8 ......,.fi8 for which 
either A is invertible or AE maps each vector of f F onto 0. ( cf. example 2 at the beginning of 
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this section.) This fact was already proved by Reeds and Manferdelli (84]. 
We shall now prove our final result. 
Theorem 3. LetR,M,Tbeintegerswith l<;;;R<;;;M<;;;T<;;;l6andT~R+7. Let 
('YR - 1o 'YR, · · · , 'Y M; "(If), ('V' T, CV' T - i. · · · , 'V' M; "1lf) be sequences of factor spaces for 
DESR,M•DES"/:/+ 1,T, respectively, such that 6Lll'=#'[OJ and 'YM=°V'M· Then 
Proof: In the proof we shall use that the inverse of a round of DES (i.e. one of the blockciphers 
F;) is equal to the round itself, except that the left half and the right half of both plaintext and 
ciphertext must be interchanged. 
We distinguish three cases: (i) M~R +4; (ii) M~T-5; (iii) M=R +3=T-4. In case (i) 
we have 'V M = IF~4 , by Lemma 5, (ii). In case (ii) we can prove, completely similar to Lemma 5, 
(ii), that CVM=IF~4 , using that all elements of {1, · · · ,56} are chosen by at least one of the map-
pings LT,LT-I· In case (iii) we have firstly, by Lemma 5,(i), 'VM='YR+ 3 ";:;2 [(O,y):yEIF~2 ]. By 
an argument completely similar to the proof of Lemma 5 (i), one has 'V= 'V' T- 4 ";:;2 
((x,O):xEIF}2 J. This completes the proof of Theorem 3. 0 
Remark. By changing PC2 in the way described at the end of §3, it is possible to replace 
the condition T~R +7 by T~R +6 in Theorem 3. This can be proved in a similar way as 
Theorem 3. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Linear structures allowing knowil-plaintext attacks on blockciphers have been investigated, 
particularly those consisting of a reduced number of consecutive rounds of DES. The first struc-
tures we looked for were "bits in the middle" independent of key bits. Such independencies were 
found only in blockciphers comprising less than eight rounds of DES. We discovered that PC2 
was not optimal in the sense that by a change of PC 2 blockciphers of seven instead of eight con-
secutive rounds of DES would have no "bits in the middle" independent of key bits. The 
existence of such independencies in blockciphers for such numbers of rounds depends only on the 
structure of the tables E, P, and PC2; these independencies would hold for any S-boxes. More 
general linear structures were also considered, namely sequences of linear factors. The existence 
of these factors depends not only on the structure of E, P, and PC2, but also on the structure of 
the S-boxes. In spite of some linear structure in S-box 4, we were able to show that blockciphers 
consisting of eight or more consecutive rounds of DES do not have sequences of linear factors 
with respect to these rounds that can reduce the search time for the key in a meet-in-the-middle 
attack. 
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A natural extension of the attacks described in this paper would seek changes in the tables 
defining the S-boxes that yield S-boxes with linear factors cooperating to give useful sequences of 
linear factors. (One might even change the S-boxes differently in different rounds.) Any 
sequence of linear factors for the cipher with the modified S-boxes is then a sequence of "near" 
linear factors for the original cipher. (As has been pointed out in §2, such attacks generalize 
several ideas in [Hellman et al 76] and [Desmedt, Quisquater and Davio 84].) In this way one 
might obtain sequences of near linear factors that allow cryptanalysis of blockciphers consisting 
of eight or more rounds of DES. 
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